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The uprisings that swept across much of the Arab Middle East during 2011 and into 
2012 have been powerful reminders of the fragility of political order. One dictator 
after another fell to the mobilized public after years of seemingly unshakeable rule in 
a serial drama that continued for much of the year. This apparent break with decades 
of routine and allegedly resilient authoritarianism calls out for explanation. It provides 
an opportunity to think about why some regimes were so vulnerable to the kinds of 
protests that erupted. Indeed, one of the most fruitful times to study the workings of 
power is when the “normal” is being challenged, when the conventions of everyday 
performance break down and fail to hold the audience. Aspects that might have been 
taken for granted or overlooked are now revealed as part of the architecture and 
artifice of domination–the carefully constructed theatres where scripted roles are 
played out, reinforcing established hierarchy and order. It is at moments of upheaval 
that one can form an impression both of the resilience of the established repertoire, 
and the resources on which those who would challenge it may be able to draw. 
Performing resistance is in this sense part of the intended reordering of power itself, 
bringing a new order into being through an appropriation of the spaces and the 
discourses that appeared hitherto to exist only for the benefit of established power. 
It is the intention of this article to reflect upon some of these performances 
and, in doing so, to reflect on the productivity of an approach that emphasizes the 
performative aspects of the political. Implicitly, therefore, this is an agency-centered 
account of the political. It is based upon the assumption that power relations are in the 
2 Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
 
final analysis relations between actors, despite the frequent attempts of one party to 
deny effective agency to the other, often preventing the other from even imagining the 
possibility of autonomous action. Such a situation makes it all the more important to 
understand the norms, the institutional structures, the rhetoric, and the incentives that 
create the enabling environment of both oppression and resistance. It is here that an 
understanding of the performative in defining agency becomes central since it sees 
performance not as extraneous but rather as implicated in the very notion of political 
behavior itself as a social act.   
The theatres in which those actions take place, as wide or as narrow as human 
experience itself, form the structural settings in which self-representation and the 
performance of roles are played out. These can appear unscripted, yet may follow 
well-structured conventions and have been features of power everywhere. When 
performed in the service of established hierarchies and political orders, they are 
implicated in the ubiquitous claim that this is part of the natural order of things. Thus, 
a specific political project or set of exclusionary arrangements can be represented as 
the supposedly validating tropes “tradition,” “national identity”, “human nature,” or 
“progress.” This is as true for the neo-liberal project, as it has been for the socialist 
ideal, and for one that asserts the primacy of religious revelation as the basis of social 
order. 
These roles are defined and constructed, and, in being performed, help to 
reproduce the subject and thus to reproduce the political order. In this sense, these 
processes lie at the center of understandings of power. The implications, therefore, for 
the critical study of power are twofold (at least). In the first place, they lead to an 
investigation of the nature of the performative in the constitution of power and the 
ways this may be shaped by forms of mutual recognition. Such an investigation 
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naturally requires some account of the ontology of performance as a basis for 
explaining why power is constituted as it is in any given setting. Second, this leads 
into the specific investigation of what can be termed the dramaturgy of political 
performance. This refers not simply to the general conditions that create political 
possibility, but the particular forms and techniques that produce the drama that has the 
power to enchant and to mobilize in practice. 
It is in this sense that the uprisings of 2011-12 across the Arab states, both in 
themselves, but also in their antecedents and their still uncertain consequences, afford 
us an opportunity to understand how new orders come into being, even in situations 
that had seemed to provide space only for performances that reinforced and validated 
the status quo. Focusing on such a way of approaching power and its underpinnings 
might help us to understand the ways in which power has been constituted, projected, 
received, accepted, and challenged in specific circumstances, contributing to a critical 
reading that embraces the “field” in its broadest sense. In particular, the events of 
2011 brought into being a mobilized public, constituted in large part through 
performances that gave it new meaning. These did not come out of nowhere. On the 
contrary, there were enabling conditions of both a material and an imaginative kind 
that had long been in the making, unconsidered by those in power, perhaps because of 
the very nature of the complacency and the contempt that colored their view of their 
subject peoples. Nevertheless, something happened in the momentous months of 2011 
that brought these strands together and transformed a newly energized and conscious 
public into a collective force that could not be ignored and that in some cases 
overturned the existing political order. 
 
2. The Ontology of Performance and Performative Power 
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In seeking to understand the relevance of the ontology of performance in the 
constitution of the political, two main themes of argument will be developed. The first 
will explore the idea of the habitus as a structure that is both formed by and formative 
of the subject, generating the social and economic roles that are both expected of and 
internalized by the agent, reproduced and reinforced by the agent’s performances. It is 
thus a concept that is deeply implicated in ideas of performance and the ways in 
which certain forms of bearing, speech, and behavior have been regarded as 
acceptable or unacceptable, reasonable or unreasonable. It is also something that is 
constituted by continuous performances, by iterations and articulations and, in turn or 
reciprocally, it also shapes the performing subject, providing an act’s context of 
intention. In this sense, therefore, it is also at the heart of power, the internalization of 
its order and the externalization of those intentions that may reinforce, or may indeed 
undermine a given dispensation.1  
However, by exploring the possibilities of the subversive changes that may be 
brought about through the same apparent set of social and intellectual formations that 
also reinforce the established order, the notion of the habitus should also be 
understood to have a potential for encompassing, even encouraging change. 
Sometimes criticized for its structural rigidity and thus its tendency towards a 
determinism that leaves little space for the agency of those shaped by it, habitus can 
nevertheless be seen to contain within it the notion of mutual constitution, not simply 
one-way determination. This is particularly significant when reflecting on the ways in 
which the uprisings of 2011 resonated across the region–a region that, on one reading, 
could be said to have been in the grip of powerful, ruthless, and repressive political 
regimes. Yet it was in just such a setting, although admittedly with different 
outcomes, that people across the region made common cause and saw in the struggles 
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of their neighbors the potential of their own resistance. In doing so, they also created 
across the region a common feeling of the need for change and a sense of their own 
power to bring it about. 
Thinking of performance in such settings opens up a number of questions 
relevant to understanding the full context and effect of power differentials between 
elite and subaltern. It can provide examples of the ways in which the elite itself is 
constituted by performances targeted at each other and at worlds beyond its shifting 
boundaries–with all the contradictions and dilemmas this engenders, as well as the 
possible implications for the techniques of performance. It also obliges one to take 
into account those whose roles have been written for them and whose complicity is 
assumed, but who might have very different ideas about the kind of performance in 
which they are involved, with potentially serious implications for the configuration of 
power.2  
Such a turn to the performative avoids the danger of attributing to a small 
group of individuals–possibly even to one person–an all-knowing and all-seeing 
capacity. Ironically reflecting the form of self-representation so beloved of these 
elites, there has been a tendency in some of the “state-society” literature to suggest 
that those who hold state power somehow stand outside and above the social and 
political universe of which they form part, manipulating the players in a detached 
way, geared only to an unambiguous understanding of their own interests. By seeing 
elite power not simply as the self-conscious outcome of the ambitions of a small self-
selected group, but as part of a larger performance that reproduces power by 
constituting and reinforcing aspects of domination, one can broaden the analysis of 
that power. Such an approach thereby encompasses those who are excluded from 
power, but who are nevertheless very much targeted and involved in the exercise of 
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that power and indeed whose subordinate position gives it meaning. They are the 
political subjects who are assigned specific roles in the performance, both as audience 
and as players, receiving, but possibly also reworking, the political myths of the 
dominant order. This may ironically create the space needed to transform such myths 
into a repertoire of resistance rather than acceptance.3  
In placing performance at the center of the political order through its power to 
shape social relations and expectations, the intention is to see it as much more than 
simply an expression or symptom of some other kind of power, located elsewhere. On 
the contrary, it may be implicated in the very constitution of political power itself. For 
example, in Egypt during the last decade or so of the regime of President Mubarak, it 
was the prime task of the ruling National Democratic Party, led by his son Gamal 
Mubarak, to spearhead the introduction of neoliberal reforms. These were allegedly 
going to transform the Egyptian economy in ways that would both satisfy the 
international financial institutions, and the interests of those in Egypt who stood most 
to gain from the program of privatization. Central to this project was the idea, but also 
the theatre, of the market, in which policy makers, investors, and the workforce were 
all ascribed distinct roles to make the project work. This involved performance both 
in the sense of acting out roles that would gain international recognition, and with it 
inward investment and support, as well as in the sense of ensuring that the Egyptians 
involved at all levels in the process acted out their parts. In other words, it bore all the 
hallmarks of the unity of action needed to reproduce the attitudes, power relations, 
and hierarchies associated with neo-liberalism.   
However, as the turbulent industrial relations of Egypt during the 21st century 
showed, the very single-mindedness of the project produced a politics of contention. 
As in Tunisia, Egyptian workers in the industries targeted for privatization, but also 
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officials at various levels of the administration, saw this as a threat to their own 
interests and even identities and mobilized accordingly. Drawing on repertoires of 
association that had historical antecedents, but that also were suggested by the very 
nature of the neo-liberal project itself, they organized in alternative spaces, forming 
themselves, through performances of difference, defiance, and solidarity, into an 
identifiable and oppositional set of political actors.4 This was not a catalyst of the 
events of 2011, but it certainly fed into them. It provided the enabling mechanisms for 
other kinds of mobilization and underlined the importance of the performative in 
challenging established power.    
The emergence of a radical critique of existing power structures, and an 
indictment of the very order that hitherto has used these very forms and signs as part 
of its own system of self-maintenance, raises the question of the conditions under 
which this happens. Surveying the events of 2011 and the years that preceded them, 
the “rupture” identified by Bourdieu could be applied to the impact of the uprisings 
themselves, but also to the more gradual processes of contested interpretations and 
failing conviction that explain why these events had such power at that time.5 In this 
context, therefore, a performative politics was both central to the project of 
governance, but equally helps to explain the power of those resisting the project. In 
both senses the performative is at the heart of power relations. 
This leads into the second strand of argument, relating to the aspects of 
performance that lend it power in any given social setting. In many respects, this is 
closely linked to specific understandings of the nature of the subject that responds to, 
acts out, and contributes to the production of the performance. The first of these 
aspects revolves around the aesthetics of performance and the degree to which it 
speaks to, and thus demands attention be paid to the ways in which enjoyment plays a 
8 Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
 
role in the constitution of the subject. Developed at length by Žižek who in turn drew 
upon Lacanian ideas of subject formation, it nevertheless also provides a link with the 
writings of Bourdieu and others. They were seeking a greater understanding of the 
ways in which an “affective politics” may explain the power of social and political 
practices in ways that elude the more conventional understandings of ideology.6  
In the light of the events of 2011-12, this may be a particularly fruitful way of 
understanding the power of uprisings that were clearly not following a path marked 
out by a defined and historically rooted ideology associated with established political 
parties and organizations. On the contrary, vast numbers of people in Tunisia came 
together around the horror of the image of Mohamed Bouazizi as he burned himself to 
death in protest against the authorities. In Egypt, thousands mobilized around the 
equally horrific picture of the mutilated face of Khaled Said that formed the centre of 
the internet campaign “We are all Khaled Said.” These were the symptoms, but also 
the triggers of an affective politics that needed no ideology or party. In what has been 
well described as the “horizontalism” of the process, organizations certainly played 
their part in helping to mobilize and solidify the protests–such as the Tunisian UGTT 
(General Labour Union), independent factory-based workers’ associations and even 
football fans, like the Ultras, in Egypt, as well as professional associations and other 
groupings in both countries.7 However, they themselves were brought together by a 
solidarity fashioned around a demand for dignity in the face of accumulated years of 
the hogra of the incumbent regimes.8 The performances of defiance and disobedience 
found their own explosive expression against the increasingly unconvincing 
performances of state power. 
Importantly, these performances of resistance that brought hundreds of 
thousands, even millions onto the streets across the Middle East, made the re-
Performing the Public: Charles Tripp     9 
 
appropriation of public space the focus and the test of their resolve. It both 
symbolized their confrontation with the old order, but also formed the battleground on 
which each tested the other. Physically and symbolically, therefore, the public spaces 
of Middle Eastern cities that had hitherto been reserved for displays of power by the 
regime became sites for the reclaiming of a public sphere in ways that only differed 
fractionally from country to country and city to city. It was as if the thousands of 
assembled protestors could tap into a repertoire that long made sense to them, but that 
could now be used to exclude and face down the overweening power of regime.9 
Faced by this, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain–as well as on a 
more limited scale in Iraq–the authorities fell back on violence, with varying 
outcomes, but with the common intention of removing, even annihilating, the bodies 
that had so clearly failed to take into themselves the habits of obedience and 
deference. 
This obvious relocation of politics to the public sphere, provides the 
constitutive link between the subject, the performance, and the spectacle. Whilst the 
latter has sometimes been treated as a kind of epiphenomenon that simply expresses 
unequal social relations constituted elsewhere, in the writings of Debord it becomes 
itself a crucial component in the socially transformative processes of 
commodification–a “world view transformed into an objective force,” with radical 
implications for the performances that comprise it and for those who are taken to be 
the chosen audiences and consumers.10 However, by articulating this idea of the 
performative spectacle to the insights originally advanced by Goffman and later 
developed by Žižek , concerning the role of the Other in the constitution of the self, it 
reinstates the notion of mutually constitutive agency into the otherwise rather passive 
and undifferentiated notions of the “consumer”, “audience”, or “the extraordinary 
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inertia” engendered by a habitus in which spectacle and commodification are 
intimately linked.11  
By re-appropriating public space, the mass of individuals involved in the 
uprisings were performing their rights as citizens, reconstituting an activist and 
mobilized public and thus, through performance, gaining both self-recognition and 
recognition by others. Furthermore, they were doing so against the dominant power, 
defining themselves against the Other, as ruler and regime. In fact, these regimes had 
helped in this production, even if unintentionally. By seeking to make their subjects 
the passive consumers of the spectacle of dictatorship, they had ironically given them 
common cause to reject both the spectacle and the multiple performances of arbitrary 
and often brutal power that underpinned it.12  
Specifically, this argument helps to throw light on the performative by 
understanding performance pre-eminently as a mutually constitutive relationship. We 
perform for others, we comport ourselves, and act aware of the gaze of others–
possibly only of certain designated others–seeking recognition but also a kind of 
validation of the self. Thus, the Other for whom the performance is enacted becomes 
a constitutive element of the performing subject in two intertwined senses: first, as the 
active subject who directly impinges on the performance through approbation, or 
possibly violent rejection; second, as the imagined and thus internalized recipient of 
the performer’s enactment of the role, shaping through inner projection the styles, 
idioms, and gestures of the performance. Nowhere was this more evident than in the 
events of 2011-12. The public was coming into being, but the very performance of it 
split the audience in many countries. On the one hand, there was the sought for and 
mobilized approbation of fellow citizens, and some elements of the state apparatus, 
affirming and reinforcing the new roles that the citizens had taken over. On the other 
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hand, as the examples of Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria showed, it also provoked 
violent rejection by the powerful in a theatre of cruelty that was intended both to 
destroy physically and to demonstrate in all its gory detail the price of dissent. 
As the uprisings of 2011 unfolded, the power of imitation, of acting out roles 
and using repertoires adapted from elsewhere became a key feature in the constitution 
of the activist citizen. This held true not only for the transmission of slogans and 
tactics from one Arab country to another. It was also the case in the emerging patterns 
of behavior in Avenue Bourguiba in Tunis, Tahrir Square in Cairo, Taghyir Square in 
Sana`a and the Pearl Roundabout in Manama. Although occurring in very different 
countries, under otherwise different conditions, the thousands who assembled 
appeared to feel the same impulse to perform the public and, in doing so, to act in 
ways that subverted the monologue of the dictatorships. The enacting of an alternative 
order of things clearly had a powerful effect on those drawn to the demonstrations and 
occupations. They may have had only a hazy idea of what it was they expected to see 
or to experience, yet their widespread imitation of those they saw around them 
through outward performance helped to focus and to transform the consciousness of 
the subjects. Indeed, in Pascal’s inversion of belief and action in the famous dictum 
that so fascinated Althusser and others–“Kneel, move your lips in prayer and you will 
believe”–it could be said to have been expressing enduring recognition of the intimate 
link between performance and the constitution of the self, as well as of the power of 
habitual performance and iteration in this process.13  
It is in this context that the idea of the habitus and the performances it 
conditions and which help to reproduce it can accommodate variable, even subversive 
patterns of behavior and performances that challenge the order with which it might be 
associated. Here Rancière’s idea of political “subjectification”–the process that 
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engenders agency–when deployed in conjunction with the process of 
“disidentification” can explain the ways in which individuals and groups, hitherto 
marginalized or allocated subordinate roles in the larger social performance of power, 
reject these roles. This can lead them to act in ways that might engage with the 
original script but only in order to assert the right to play roles with radically 
transformative implications for the established hierarchy.14 This in turn, draws our 
attention to the contours of such performances and to the conditions under which 
certain kinds of performances succeed in achieving the power to which they aspire, 
whilst others fail and, in failing, may produce a very different orientation of the 
political drama. 
 
3. The Dramaturgy of Performance 
It is for these reasons that it is important to take into account the dramatic conventions 
surrounding, infusing, or enframing the performance–the dramaturgy of performance. 
This helps not only to explain common structures, but it can also account for their 
power, when they “work” and when they fail to do so. It is here in part that one might 
begin to explain the extraordinary force and coordinated effect of the uprisings of 
2011. The fact that events similar to these had taken place over the past decades in 
many Middle Eastern states, but at different times in relatively isolating 
circumstances, helped to prepare the ground. Enabling structures, networks, and 
associations had endured, even if dormant. Equally, the embodied memories of 
previous uprisings had provided a repertoire familiar to many. It is perhaps not 
surprising, therefore, that so many people grasped so immediately what it was about 
in 2011.15   
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 However, the combined power of these developments may also be explained, 
at one level, by the narrative logic of performance as a particular kind of social 
activity. More specifically, despite its location in a very distinct cultural space, there 
may be more general structures underlying particular performances that prompt its 
recognition as a drama, enhancing its narrative and dramatic power. In this respect, it 
requires an exploration of the frame of the performance that places and dramatizes it 
within systems of recognition, implying an understanding of the epistemology of 
framing itself. Here, in the context of the mass protests of 2011, there were the 
generic and powerful calls for dignity, respect, freedom, and public rights that 
resonated across the region. But there were also the equally moving statements of 
intent and volition by individuals caught up in the drama. They responded in ways 
that gained instant recognition, amplifying what may initially have been a particular 
protest, but coming together through the poetry, drama, and often humor of the 
performance to act out and indeed to become the public as a collective body and 
political actor of immense and diverse political potential.16  
These aspects draw one’s attention to specific areas that help to link the larger 
questions arising from the idea of the performative in politics, to the specific 
questions of dramaturgical possibility, showing thereby the limitations on the power 
of performance in practice. Based on the fundamental structure of drama as a 
purposeful human activity and the relationship that lies at its core–that between 
performers and their audience–two such areas suggest themselves. First, there is the 
setting or stage, both temporal and spatial, that expresses, but also helps form, the 
relationship between performers and audience. Second, there is the structure of the 
narrative, as well as its symbolic resonance, its presentation and the nature of the roles 
that make sense of the performance and give it its power. These factors help to 
14 Constellations Volume 20, Number 2, 2013 
 
constitute this key relationship and to form the subjectivities that interact through 
drama. 
In assessing the events of 2011-12 that comprised mass uprisings and multiple 
acts of resistance across many of the Arab states, the beginning of any enquiry must 
revolve around the forces or factors that brought the performers and the intended 
audience together – in other words, why this grouping, why here and why now? 
Whatever the nature of the relationship – performers acting out of defiance in the face 
of established power, or acting to impress upon the outside world the nature and the 
potential of their cause, or seeking to integrate with those before whose gaze they are 
performing–it is important to understand the historical and spatial conjuncture. In this 
case, whether in Tunis, in the cities of Egypt, or of Syria, or of Libya, it was urban 
public space that became the most meaningful setting for action. The determined re-
appropriation of the Avenue Bourguiba in Tunis, or Tahrir Square in Cairo, or 
Arbaeen Square in Suez, or the Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain all conveyed powerful 
messages about the power relations embodied in and reproduced by these settings, as 
well as their potential for resistance. It was for this very reason that the Bahraini 
authorities, having cleared the roundabout of demonstrators in March 2011, 
proceeded to demolish the monument at its heart, so powerful was its symbolism. 
Occupation and demonstration thus provided an understanding of the congruence of 
the roles with those settings. They enabled the political public to come into being 
through multiple performances in public spaces.17  
In this sense, performative politics in its constant enactment is also 
constitutive of the self and the political subject:  it involves and, by involving, furthers 
the construction of identities, interests, and selves. It directs our attention towards the 
setting that is itself being constantly reproduced and towards the other forces that are 
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also working on that setting. In other words, there is very rarely the situation of the 
“captive audience”–and these other factors can have important effects on the way the 
performance is constructed and construed. This also ties into the question of the 
transformative dialectic of self and other in performance and the part this plays in the 
constitution of the self: we become what we act, and we act before others and their 
expectations of us, through our expectations of them. This never happens in a neutral 
environment, but in a setting where power differentials are very much part of the 
practice and where it could be argued that the interpellation of the subject has initiated 
the performance. In this respect, it is important to consider the ways in which 
particular kinds of sites for the staging and framing of performances may be 
congruent with the systematic evasion of reciprocity, at least in intention.18  
Some have argued that this has been one of the marked attributes of the 
“mediatization” of public life: presentation and performance through the visual media 
have introduced not simply a new, amplified technology of performance (for the 
powerful, a multi-screen, 24/7 presentation of the Roman triumph), but have created a 
qualitative shift in the way that performance works and the ways in which a passive, 
consuming public is constituted.19 Yet the events of 2011-12 in the Middle East–and 
elsewhere, it should be said–would appear to support the argument that whatever the 
intention, performance cannot in fact ever be purely a one-way street, precisely 
because of the ontological questions raised at the outset. Thus, whilst power may seek 
to project itself through the electronic media and to fashion docile, willing, and 
impressed recipients or consumers, it must itself be partly constituted by them, by 
their expectations, and by the input of those for whom the performance is intended.   
This was made manifest in a number of ways in 2011. There were the 
demonstrations in front of media centers that had for so long been associated with the 
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regimes’ versions of the manufactured public. In Dar`a in Syria, the local building of 
the state broadcasting authority was burnt down. In Cairo, both in February and, more 
violently, in October 2011 demonstrators protesting about the lies broadcast by 
Egypt’s state media were confronted by units of the Egyptian army. More insidiously 
and subversively, the newly mobilized public did not just show itself in the streets, 
but had already begun to dominate the social media. Using its networks and those 
enabled by other forms of electronic communication, members of the public became 
“citizen journalists,” both reporting on and filming the events they were witnessing 
and in which they were participating, as well as commenting on them and helping to 
mobilize others, amplifying the messages of defiance and resistance. In this sense, the 
media in all its forms had been transformed into a platform for the portrayal and 
performance of resistance, giving substance to the mobilized public.20   
In order to understand the effects of these performances, it is important to 
examine the idioms and the repertoire involved, as well as the ways in which they are 
brought together to reinforce the persuasive power of a particular narrative and to 
amplify its dramatic effect. How do certain performances and dramatic narratives 
“hook,” engage, and mobilize people around a version of the political? In order to 
understand this and to assess the relationship between the performance and other 
forms of power one would need to look at the processes of interpellation of subjects, 
both the performers and those before whom they performed. In some cases, it might 
be hard to distinguish the two and that may well be part of the explanation.21 This is 
of particular significance in understanding the otherwise puzzling speed, spread, and 
coherence of the uprisings of 2011, disorganized and leaderless as they apparently 
were. 
Performing the Public: Charles Tripp     17 
 
This raises the question of whether there are key elements in such 
performances that repeat or take up again familiar themes, lending them an impact 
that depends upon recognition. However, by the same token, familiar performances 
may be subject to the rules of dramatic decay. Thus, repetition can create the fever of 
anticipation, as well as the glow of recognition and familiarity. But it can also 
engender boredom and a cynical distance from the performance. To some degree, this 
was experienced in the course of 2011 and 2012 in Egypt, when continued public 
suspicions of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces [SCAF] led to 
successive demonstrations and occupations of Tahrir during the course of these 
months. Quite apart from the increasingly ferocious response by the armed forces to 
the continued defiance of their authority, the demonstrators also discovered that there 
was a falling off in the numbers and commitment of the participants. As the mobilized 
and plural public began to find its multiple voices, some of the issues became more 
divisive.   
In the aftermath of the fall of President Mubarak, some felt that the successors 
should be given the benefit of the doubt and should not be continually opposed. 
Furthermore, resistance through similar performances of demonstration and 
occupation diminished their power. They had become over familiar, paler repetitions 
of performances that had originally had power and meaning. In addition, the theatre of 
power was changing, moving away from the public spaces of the city to the public 
institutions of a revived parliament, an electoral process, and the nominally public 
administrative apparatus of the state. These were the sites that were to be the main 
battlegrounds between the emerging popular forces, Islamist and secular, and the 
entrenched power of the military establishment, as the tense months leading up to the 
election of President Morsi in June 2012 bore witness.22 Different kinds of 
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expectations were created, as well as different forms of behavior with performances 
appropriate to the ill-defined roles of all the players. Those who felt excluded from 
this process and who yearned for the seemingly more straightforward dramas of early 
2011 were still mobilized, but were having to find other ways of acting upon their 
grievances. This suggests that the success of the performance will be dependent on 
the relationship with the audience and will require attention to the rules of dramatic 
timing, phrasing, engagement, and aesthetic appeal, however diverse these aspects 
may be.23  
Of course, part of the explanation for the falling off in the numbers of those 
willing to enact the public in Tahrir and its environs may have been due to SCAF’s 
authorization of extreme violence to clear the square of the demonstrators calling for 
their downfall. Participants in one kind of performance found themselves confronted 
by those willing to act out roles to a very different script. By comparison with the 
violence used by the security forces in Syria, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen against 
demonstrators, that used in Egypt was moderate, although in the demonstrations of 
October and November 2011 some fifty Egyptians were killed by the security forces. 
However, the question of violence does raise the question about its role in the drama 
of performative politics, some of the key features of which have indeed been borne 
out by some of the developments associated with the uprisings in the Middle East 
during 2011 and 2012. 
An important and often productive way of studying and understanding 
political violence in all its forms is as a performative act, communicative but also 
theatrical, geared to specific settings and audiences, requiring specific roles and the 
maintenance of those roles. Political violence in this sense is aimed at achieving 
certain goals through the amplification of its effect. Indeed, calculating how to 
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generate such an effect becomes one of the major preoccupations of those who would 
use it as an integral part of their political project. Violence in this sense is also 
constitutive: it helps to construct political publics through the responses to the ways in 
which violence is represented. In doing so, it shapes the “realities” that frame the 
debate about the performance of violence, its means and its ends, as well as the norms 
governing both.24  
Political violence clearly foregrounds the spectacle in a way that suggests both 
enjoyment and drama in the reinforcement or indeed in the unsettling of power. These 
are performative effects, aspired to both by established power and by those 
challenging the hegemonic claims of established power by spectacularly 
demonstrating its inadequacy. Political violence as performance makes it a language 
of power both entrenched and insurgent. In many of the countries that witnessed 
uprisings in 2011 and 2012 in the Middle East, it was striking that so many hundreds 
of thousands made a conscious decision to answer this with the performance of 
nonviolence. In Tunisia, in Egypt, and in Bahrain, but also initially in Yemen, Libya, 
and Syria the protestors and demonstrators asserted their presence and their power 
through nonviolent action. Precisely to counter the violence of the state and, it was 
hoped, to neutralize or at least confuse and split the security forces, as well as to 
communicate a powerful message of nonviolent resistance, of a people returning to 
reclaim what was rightfully theirs, the demonstrators occupied public spaces under 
the ubiquitous chant of “Silmiya! Silmiya!” [peaceful, peaceful]. The performance of 
nonviolence was thus a key part of their political formation, as well as of their 
strategies, its techniques studied and communicated from country to country, often 
codified in instruction manuals such as the Tahrir publication “Kayf tathawwur bi-
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hada’iah” [how to revolt peacefully], or the advice from the Serbian youth movement 
Otpor that had helped to overthrow President Milosevic in 2000.25  
Elsewhere, as the examples of Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Syria showed, 
nonviolent protest was met by ferocious violence on the part of the authorities. They 
were seeking not merely to clear protestors from public spaces but also to annihilate 
any form of open resistance, as well as to make an example of those who might be 
even vaguely connected with opposition, or with towns and villages where dissent had 
come into the open. In Libya and in Syria, in particular, the violence of the regime’s 
response provoked counter-violence by the protestors. In the Libyan case, this led to a 
split in the armed forces and the division of the country into two hostile camps, with 
the insurgents, assisted by massive NATO air intervention, finally overcoming the 
forces led by the government of Mu`ammar Qadhafi after months of fighting. In 
Syria, the relentless use of force by a government intent on reasserting its control over 
the whole of the country, in the face of growing numbers of armed insurgents, led to 
some 20,000 deaths, mostly civilians, in the space of eighteen months as the country 
slid into civil war. 
In the initial stages of the Syrian uprising the tens of thousands of citizens who 
came out in protest against their government were clearly determined to sustain and to 
develop nonviolent means of resistance and civil disobedience. This may have been 
due in part to a widespread belief that imitation of the methods used in Tunisia and 
Egypt would produce equally dramatic results against a regime that appeared to be 
just as well entrenched. The power of the performative example had, after all, been 
evident across the region in the early months of 2011. However, there was also a more 
general concern in Syria about the possible effects of the use of violence against the 
security forces of the regime.   
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Many remembered the terrible example of the city of Hama, much of which 
had been destroyed by units of the Syrian armed forces in 1982 with the loss of some 
10-15,000 lives. They had paid the price for an armed insurrection by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the city. The Brotherhood had by then been leading an armed revolt 
against the regime for four years, despite misgivings within the organization that they 
were effectively “playing into” an existing theatre or dramatic production of authority 
and power, dangerously reinforcing it. For a regime such as that of the Ba`th in Syria, 
violent opposition, both in 1982 and in 2011-12, “made sense” imaginatively and 
tactically. It fitted precisely into the role that they had assigned all opposition, 
portraying dissent as nothing more than the work of “armed gangs,” fired by 
fanaticism and manipulated by the enemies of Syria.   
In this respect, therefore, the violent resistance was much less disconcerting 
for the regime than the performance of nonviolence, something that did not enter into 
the lexicon of the regime and that seemed, therefore, potentially more threatening. It 
was perhaps for this reason that the peaceful demonstrations of the first months of the 
uprising in 2011 met an immediately violent response from the security forces. They 
were trying to disperse and to deter the demonstrators, but they may also have been 
hoping the change the nature of the performance itself and the stage on which it was 
to be played out. During 2012 in particular, the transformation of the mass of 
protestors occupying public spaces into guerrilla bands, making hit and run raids on 
the security forces, came long after the Syrian government’s early claim in 2011 that 
this was what they were facing by way of opposition. It was as if they had scripted 
these roles because it was this, not the reinvention and mobilization of the Syrian 
public, that fitted so well their own political imagination and their own fifty-year long 
performance.26  
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In another respect too, the demonstrators feared the performances in which 
they might become implicated, should violence become the principal means of 
expressing opposition. From the outset of the protests in March 2011 they had made a 
point not only of constituting themselves as a peaceful public reclaiming their rights, 
but also as a national public of Syrian citizens. Thus the performance of nonviolence 
was accompanied by performances of national identity and unity. The massed ranks 
of demonstrators would chant “One! One! Syrians are One!” clearly determined to 
present themselves as a body of Syrian citizens, a distinctively Syrian public.27 This 
was precisely to counter the other powerful narrative of Syrian political society that 
emphasized the confessional diversity of the Syrian people, where some seventy 
percent might be Sunni Muslims, but the remaining thirty percent were Ismailis, 
Druze, Christians, and, of course, Alawis. The latter was the confessional identity of 
the ruling clan of the al-Asads, and of many of the senior figures in the regime, 
especially those associated with the security and intelligence services. Open rebellion 
in such a system therefore always ran the risk of becoming entangled in sectarian 
enmities. 
The risk was redoubled if violence was to be the main medium of the uprising. 
Under such conditions, as had happened in the neighboring states of Lebanon and of 
Iraq, the life and death nature of armed struggle placed a premium on trust. On the 
one hand it encouraged fears among the minorities that the expression of popular 
protest was really a disguised bid by the majority community for power. On the other 
hand, it opened up the suspicion that certain villages, certain urban quarters might be 
unreliable in the struggle because they were inhabited by people who shared minority 
status with the regime. In addition to this, there was always the danger of symbolic 
violence against individuals simply because they came from the Alawi community.   
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The regime itself was well aware of these possible fracture lines in the Syrian 
public and exploited them to their advantage, playing upon the fears of minorities 
about the disorder and violence that could follow the overthrow of the regime. At the 
same time, as the uprising gathered strength, the authorities encouraged the sectarian 
aspect, deploying the Shabbiha [ghosts], an armed militia largely recruited from and 
clearly associated with the networks of Alawi clans from the Alawi Mountains and 
the coastal plain. This militia was responsible for ferocious attacks on demonstrators 
and on dissidents, often imposing collective punishment on entire villages and 
families. In this respect, as with the use of force more generally, it appeared that the 
Syrian regime was trying to script a performance that would indeed entwine violence 
and sectarian hatred. Dangerous and bloody though this was, it was a counter to the 
protestors’ performance of the unity of the Syrian people, and thus more attuned to 
the narrative that had long reinforced the power of the al-Asad clan. 
In this sense, therefore, violence and nonviolence are performances that 
generate their own power, constitutive as well as destructive, although in very 
different ways. One of the extraordinary achievements of hundreds of thousands of 
citizens in Tunisia and in Egypt in 2011 was their success in toppling dictators by 
nonviolent means, making redundant and therefore neutralizing the coercive powers 
that the authorities still had at their disposal. In Libya and in Yemen, similar 
performances had the equally dramatic, although in the end far more bloody effect, of 
cracking the coercive power of the regime itself, turning its instruments of violence 
upon each other. In all these cases, however, there was little doubt that the unfolding 
drama and the spectacle of a mobilized public, performing resistance before multiple 
audiences, drove the narrative, as it did in Bahrain and in Syria where the outcomes 
have been very different.   




The events of 2011-12 in a number of states in the Arab Middle East have been 
dramatic and moving indicators of the power of ordinary people when mobilized and 
acting in concert, even against entrenched and ruthless regimes. In their drama and in 
their capacity to move others far beyond the borders of particular states, or even the 
region itself, they have demonstrated the performative aspects of politics at their most 
potent. In doing so, they are a useful reminder of the underlying performative nature 
of much of political life, not only in its open forms of contestation, but in the 
establishment and incorporation of the routines by which order is maintained. In this 
sense, therefore, as a frame for studying both the workings of a dominant order, as 
well as the potential of its challengers, to understand performative politics is to 
engage with much more than the visible and the demonstrative. 
These certainly form part of the analysis and a crucial part as well, given the 
key factors of aesthetic and affective display, the repertoire, and the dramaturgical 
logic in explaining the power of performance in shaping the course of human actions. 
However, this examination of performative politics goes further than that. It also 
suggests that it is through performance that identities, social formations, and relations, 
as well as dispositions, are constituted. It is this that makes an understanding of the 
performative so central to an understanding of power. In that key relationship reside 
not only the imagination, norms, and habits that people bring to it, but also the 
potential to be transformed by it and thus by the performance of the other that may be 
encountered therein. The outcomes, as the events of 2011 onwards have 
demonstrated, may be contested, complex, and subversive of the intentions of all 
parties, but they will be outcomes intelligible to, if not desired by all. The challenge 
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for many, and the underpinning of a new round of contestation, will be to ensure that 
they have the same ability to participate in the changing theatres of power as they 
seized so dramatically in 2011. The fear is that they may be subject to new regimes of 
prescription and exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, gender, sect, or ideological 
difference that oblige them once more to perform the passive and subordinate subject. 
It remains to be seen whether these events represent the kind of shock that is 
both the outcome of significant, if gradual changes in the habitus, as well as the 
catalyst that allows new norms to establish themselves, calling forth significantly 
different performances. There were some who claimed, for instance, to have seen 
such changes as an immediate outcome of the gathering of a mass public in Tahrir 
Square in Cairo, visible not only in the care that people took of public property and 
public space, but also of each other in terms of respect for difference. In part this was 
planned, a deliberate construction of the square in January/February 2011 as a public 
theatre of civility, but it could also be seen in the ways in which people began to 
behave towards each other, promising, for the optimists, new norms, and possibilities 
in social life.   
Powerful as these norms were at that moment and in that space, they have 
evidently dissipated somewhat the further people moved from the performative arena 
of Tahrir. It has clearly been the intention of many in Egyptian public life to ensure 
that the new institutions of the Egyptian state and the new rules for political life 
enshrine and reinforce those norms, securing them into the future by building them 
into the performance of the political. In this task, as the course of Egyptian politics 
since February 2011 has demonstrated, they are up against those who have other 
priorities, and who may see such performances as a threat to their own identities and 
interests. Most notoriously this has been embodied in the SCAF, but there are others, 
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both within the Islamist trend and beyond it, who share their restrictive and 
regimented ideas about political performance, its permitted roles, and the actors 
allowed to play them. 
In this respect, performances, like the politics of which they form a part, are 
never fixed, despite the best endeavors to make them so. For established and 
entrenched power, they hold out the promise of disciplining their subjects in ways that 
reinforce the status quo, blinding them to the scripted inequality of the roles they are 
expected to play. This can indeed work as intended for some considerable time, 
especially when reinforced by other imaginative and material inducements to 
conformity. However, like all performances they are also subject to decay. Gradually 
the roles become hollow, less meaningful, and finally less effective in staving off 
subversion and disruption. By the same token, insurgent forces, appropriating new 
theatres of action, acting in ways that challenge everything the status quo stands for, 
put their energies into ensuring that their radically different scripts will thenceforth 
shape public life. In the case of the uprisings of 2011 they succeeded in giving 
substance to the very role of the public itself for the first time in decades.   
Now, in the aftermath of the overthrow of the dictators, the insurgents too face 
the challenge of ensuring that the moment of enthusiastic, even cathartic, 
performance, can be carried on into the institutions and practices of the new political 
order. As political developments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen have shown, 
the uprisings have opened up a long and contentious period in which citizens will be 
trying various ways of giving substance to civility whilst encompassing the diversity 
that had emerged in the mobilized but plural publics of these countries. Precisely 
because the theatres of power have shifted, the roles and the performances are still 
being worked out. An uncertain balance exists between the spontaneous adlibbing that 
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draws upon a repertoire challenging authority and the fully scripted roles that have 
been mapped out by those who still control key institutional and coercive powers in 
the state. 
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